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q-EXPONENTIAL BEHAVIOR OF EXPECTED AGGREGATED
SUPPLY CURVES IN DEREGULATED ELECTRICITY
MARKETS
C. CADAVID, M. E. PUERTA, J. D. VE´LEZ, AND JUAN F. GARCI´A
Abstract. It has been observed that the expected aggregated supply curves of
the colombian electricity market present q-exponential behavior. The purpose
of this article is to present evidence supporting the fact that q-exponentiality is
already present in the expected aggregated supply curve of certain extremely
simple idealized deregulated electricity markets where illegal interaction among
competing firms is precluded.
1. Introduction
In the last two decades, more and more countries have adopted a deregulated
electricity market policy. In these countries, an inverse auction mechanism is im-
plemented each day in order to determine, for the next day, which generating units
will be operating, how much electricity will be supplied by each one of them, and
its unitary price. Since the electrical sector is of utmost importance in any coun-
try’s economy, it is important to understand various aspects of the corresponding
market. One of such aspects is the expected aggregated supply curve, which will be
refered to as supply curve for short, resulting from the competition among gener-
ating firms. It has been observed that the supply curve for each of the years in
the period 2005-2011, in the colombian electricity market (a deregulated one), are
well fitted by suitably scaled q-exponential curves, where the values of q vary from
year to year and are generally different from 1 [4]. The presence of q-exponential
behavior or q-deformed behavior in general, has been observed in quantities arising
in similar contexts. In [1] certain quantities associated to the Czech Republic pub-
lic procurement market (an auction type market), for the period 6/2006-8/2011,
are analyzed. Specifically, those authors look at the behavior of three quantities,
namely, the probability that a contract has x− 1 bidders or more, the probability
that a public procurement selling agent makes x euros or more during the observed
period (6/2006-8/2011), and the probability that a contracting authority spends x
or more euros during the observed period, as functions of x − 1 in the first case,
and x in the second and third cases. They observe that the first function is very
well approximated by certain exponential, while the second and third functions,
are very well approximated by certain power functions. Now, exponential functions
and power functions correspond to q-exponentials, with q = 1 in the first case and
q 6= 1 in the second one. In [2] the probability distribution of certain quantities
associated to the opening call auctions in the chinese stock market are studied. In
particular, it is shown that the probability distribution of order sizes is well fitted
by certain q-Gamma function.
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Even though the presence of q-deformed behavior, with q 6= 1, may be taken as
evidence of complexity in the dynamics governing the corresponding processes, ille-
gal interaction between participants and so on, it is still valid to ask whether there
is already q-deformed behavior, with q 6= 1, in situations having low complexity
and complete transparency.
In this article we study the presence of q-deformed behavior in the seemingly
most simple situation arising in deregulated electricity markets. Concretely, we
consider an electricity market composed of a number of generating firms, each
one having a single generating set capable of supplying (after normalization) one
electricity unit per day whose production cost is assumed (after normalization) to
be zero. In addition, the demand is a discrete random variable whose probability
distribution is known by all firms. As was mentioned before, the firms compete each
day in a reverse auction in order to be selected as an electricity supplier for the
next day. This simple market can be thought as a repeated game in the framework
of classical game theory, i.e. one in which players are rational and have complete
knowledge of the game structure. Therefore, we assume that players place their
bids according to a Nash equilibrium. After calculating and solving a differential
equation whose solution is the unique symmetric Nash equilibrium possesed by this
game, we estimate the supply curve by simulating repetitions of this game. We
observed that for various background probability distributions for the demand, and
a range of numbers of generating firms, the supply curves are well fitted by q-
exponential curves, usually with q 6= 1, and that for fixed background distribution,
the value of q gets closer to 1 as the number of generating firms increases. Towards
the end of the paper we propose a plausible explanation for these phenomena.
2. General model
In this section we closely follow [3]. We assume that the electricity generating
system is formed by N electricity generating firms g1, . . . , gN , and that each firm
gn has mn generating units or sets sn1, . . . , snmn . Let M =
∑N
n=1mn be the total
number of sets of the whole generation system. Each set sni can produce at most
kni electrity units per day and has a cost function cni : [0,∞) → R, assigning
to each q ∈ [0,∞), the cost cni(q) of producing q electricity units using sni. Let
K =
∑
ni kni be the total daily capacity of the generating system. We assume
that the amount of electricity demanded by the consumers in one day is a random
variable d that distributes according to certain cumulative distribution function G
supported on some interval [d, d] ⊂ [0,K]. Policies for the market demand that
firms can only offer unitary prices lying within certain interval [p, p]. It is assumed
that all the information above is common knowledge. The mechanism by which
electricity is bought is the following. Each day (day t), each gn secretely submits a
vector (pn1, . . . , pnmn) to a coordinating entity, expressing its willingness to produce
the next day (day t + 1), using set sni, any amount of electricity in the interval
[0, kni], and to sell it at a unitary price of pni. At this point we emphasize the fact
that the generators decide on their price vectors knowing the distribution G but
without knowing the particular value it takes the next day. Once the coordinating
entity receives all these N vectors, it chooses a ranking of the prices, i.e. a bijective
function r : {(n, i) : n = 1, . . . , N, i = 1, . . . ,mn} → {1, . . . ,M} such that r(n, i) <
r(m, j) whenever pni < pmj . Notice that this choice is not unique whenever there
exist pairs (n, i) 6= (m, j) such that pni = pmj. More precisely, if {A1, . . . , Al} is the
q-EXPONENTIAL BEHAVIOR OF EXPECTED AGGREGATED SUPPLY CURVES IN DEREGULATED ELECTRICITY MARKETS3
partition induced on the set {(n, i) : n = 1, . . . , N, i = 1, . . . ,mn} by the equivalence
relation (n, i) ≡ (m, j) iff pni = pmj , the number of choices is |A1|! · · · |Al|!. Here
|Aj | denotes the number of elements of the set Aj . This number will be denoted by
R(p11, . . . , pNmN ). The coordinator randomly selects one of the possible rankings
according to a uniform distribution, i.e. with probability 1|A1|!···|Al|! . Once a ranking
r is chosen, the coordinator looks at the actual demand of electricity d for day t+1.
It is useful at this point to rename the generating units and all the entities associated
to them, according to their rank, i.e. to denote the unit sni by sr(n,i), kni by kr(n,i),
and so on. The coordinator considers the numbers K0 = 0 and Kj =
∑j
a=1 ka for
j = 1, . . . ,M , and determines ρ = max{j : Kj−1 < d}. Then the coordinator
dictates that on day t + 1, each unit sj with j < ρ will supply its full capacity
kj , that unit sρ will supply d − Kρ−1 units of electricity, and that each unit of
electricity will be paid at price pρ. It is understood that units sj with j > ρ will
not supply any electricity and therefore will not receive any payment. The utility
for firm gn is therefore given by
(2.1) un = δn(ρ) [(d−Kρ−1)pρ − cρ(d−Kρ−1)] +
ρ−1∑
j=1
δn(j) [kjpρ − cj(kj)]
where δn(l) is 1 if sl belongs to firm gn and is zero otherwise.
Since we will consider the case when (i) each generator gn has a single generating
unit sn1, (ii) each generating unit has capacity 1, (iii) all cost functions are cn1 =
0, (iv) the demand is a discrete random variable taking values {1, . . . , N} , and
(v) p = 0; these five conditions will be assumed to hold for the rest of the paper.
In this case it is important to slightly modify our notation. Instead of writing
sn1, kn1, cn1, pn1 we will write s
n, kn, cn, pn, respectively. The renaming of units
and associated entities induced by a ranking r keeps being the same as before, i.e.
sn, kn, cn, pn are renamed as sr(n,1), kr(n,1), cr(n,1), pr(n,1), respectively.
The assumption that firms want to maximize their utilities, naturally leads to the
interpretation of the whole situation as the repetition of a three stage game: first,
firms choose their prices in the interval [0, p], then nature chooses a value for the
demand according to some probability distribution pii = Pr(d = i), i = 1, . . . , N ,
and finally the coordinator makes the dispatchment according to the rules already
explained. Notice that the latter step involves a random choice in order to resolve
ties. The utilities for each firm depend on the prices being offered by all firms, the
value taken by the demand and the particular ranking chosen by the coordinator.
This game can thought as a random experiment, whose sample space is
(2.2)
Ω = {(p1, . . . , pN , d, r) : each pn ∈ [0, p], d ∈ {1, . . . , N}, r a ranking for (p1, . . . , pN )}
with probability density function f (pdf) having the form
(2.3) f(p1, . . . , pN , d, r) = f1(p1) . . . fN(pN ).pid.
1
R(p1, . . . , pN )
.
Here f1, . . . , fN are some pdf’s. In this setting the utility functions u1, . . . , uN
become random variables. The functions f1, . . . , fN according to which firms choose
their prices, form a Nash equilibrium, if for each n, the expected utility of firm n,
(2.4) Ef1,...,fn,...,fN (un) ≥ Ef1,...,f˜n,...,fN (un)
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for any other pdf f˜n. It is equivalent but much easier to work with the correspond-
ing cummulative distribution functions F1, . . . , FN . These will be nondecreasing
functions defined on [0, p], having value 0 at p = 0 and 1 at p = p, and admitting
(jump) discontinuities.
According to proposition 6 in [3] F1 = . . . = FN = F is a (symmetric) Nash
equilibrium if and only if F is a nondrecreasing function defined on a closed interval
[pm, p] with 0 < pm < p, such that F (pm) = 0, F (p) = 1, and satisfying the
differential equation
(2.5)
N∑
i=1
pii {H
′
ip+Hi + pG
′
i(p)} = 0
where
Hi =
(
N − 1
i− 1
)
F (p)i−1(1− F (p))N−i
and
Gi(p) =
N−1∑
k=i−1
(
N − 1
k
)
F (p)k(1− F (p))N−1−k .
We remark that this differential equation derives from the general fact that a
profile of mixed strategies F1, . . . , FN is a Nash equilibrium if and only if for each
n, the (expected) profit of firm gn assuming that it plays the pure strategy pn = p
while any other firm gn′ plays according to Fn′ , is independent of p. We observe
that this differential equation can be solved by separation of variables.
3. Experiments and results
In order to survey the behavior of supply curves in general, we wrote routines in
Mathematica 10.1 and used them for testing various scenarios. The main routine,
called GranProgramaP, assumes p¯ = 100 and for given distribution of background
demand, and positive integers N and T , it first determines the differential equa-
tion 2.5, finds the solution F to this differential equation subject to the condition
F (100) = 1, and then, for each 1 ≤ i ≤ T , it produces an N -vector vi, by first mak-
ing N independent (random) choices of numbers in the interval [0, 100] according
to F , sorting these numbers in increasing order, and finally computing the aver-
age N -vector V = 1
T
∑T
i=1 vi. Finally, the Mathematica command NMinimize is
applied to find, among the curves y = f(x) = α expq(βx) with α, β, q > 0, and
N − 12 <
1
β(q−1) whenever q > 1, one that (approximately) minimizes the quadratic
error
N∑
j=1
(
Vj − f
(
j −
1
2
))2
.
Next we present the considered scenarios and the results obtained in each case.
The reason for the kind of experiment performed in each of these scenarios is clari-
fied in section 4. The following four experiments have the following common struc-
ture. We assume a market with N generating firms, each of them capable of
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producing 1/N units per day at production cost zero, and with demand being a
discrete random variable taking values i/N for i = 1, . . . , N , with probability
pii = Pr(demand = i/N) =
∫ i
N
i−1
N
h(x) dx,
for a fixed probability distribution h supported on the interval [0, 1]. We refer to
h as the background distribution for the demand. This is of course equivalent to a
market with N generating firms, each of them capable of producing 1 unit per day
at production cost zero, and with demand being a discrete random variable taking
values i = 1, . . . , N , with probability
pii = Pr(demand = i) =
∫ i
N
i−1
N
h(x) dx.
So the experiments only differ by the choice of background distribution. In all four
experiments we set T = 10000 and for NMinize we selected the RandomSearch
method with 500 search points.
3.1. Experiment 1. In this experiment we took h(x) = 1, 0 ≤ x ≤ 1 as back-
ground distribution for the demand. Table 1 shows the results obtained for values
of N from 5 to 28.
Uniform demand
N q α β quadratic error
5 0.863233 2.9002 0.823226 0.0193731
6 0.89449 1.2304 0.859379 0.0672908
7 0.892939 0.437755 0.980874 0.00743362
8 0.916562 0.183676 0.972093 0.00345962
9 0.933164 0.0836263 0.955353 0.00345632
10 0.93709 0.0322543 0.997464 0.00232163
11 0.939185 0.0121861 1.04244 0.00379461
12 0.947345 0.00562502 1.02362 0.00259078
13 0.943343 0.00147738 1.1462 0.0115656
14 0.957351 0.000978965 1.02787 0.00465776
15 0.962617 0.000435722 1.01207 0.0013087
16 0.987828 0.000814185 0.765452 0.0169305
17 0.969912 0.000107791 0.972005 0.00665632
18 0.950759 4.94466× 10−6 1.4119 0.0184282
19 0.968327 0.0000111811 1.06863 0.00827299
20 0.973942 8.62225× 10−6 0.988244 0.00439083
21 0.991221 0.0000229271 0.76225 0.0286424
22 0.982056 2.77873× 10−6 0.908473 0.0226434
23 0.984581 1.54111× 10−6 0.882888 0.0220357
24 0.992261 2.3351× 10−6 0.769326 0.0998453
25 0.995941 2.15478× 10−6 0.717738 0.0957674
26 0.993057 6.32775× 10−7 0.761542 0.087408
27 1.0081 2.26665× 10−6 0.596923 0.154767
28 1.01065 1.5224× 10−6 0.575789 0.199678
Table 1.
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3.2. Experiment 2. In this experiment we took h(x) = 3x2, 0 ≤ x ≤ 1 as back-
ground distribution for the demand. Table 2 shows the results obtained for values
of N from 5 to 28.
Demand’s f.d.p based on 3x2, 0 ≤ x ≤ 1
N q α β quadratic error
5 0.786277 9.24399 0.562637 0.000517729
6 0.848111 4.08727 0.632552 0.0713172
7 0.882261 1.72287 0.691693 0.0499626
8 0.905359 0.724865 0.738601 0.012073
9 0.910659 0.289822 0.805672 0.00154287
10 0.923683 0.114552 0.843706 0.0121201
11 0.940745 0.0609441 0.80781 0.0103708
12 0.952511 0.0259056 0.810255 0.00760159
13 0.953217 0.0102512 0.850152 0.00430776
14 0.962814 0.00485199 0.829615 0.0294654
15 0.959879 0.00173207 0.888678 0.0151036
16 0.956018 0.000481014 0.983035 0.00436682
17 0.962618 0.000285168 0.934857 0.0044448
18 0.967372 0.000148451 0.910055 0.0162562
19 0.974735 0.0000893455 0.85638 0.00924199
20 0.973182 0.0000324616 0.896141 0.0112569
21 0.962477 2.70374× 10−6 1.14381 0.0111554
22 0.990649 0.0000259162 0.725679 0.0354996
23 0.975639 2.1441× 10−6 0.938534 0.0101328
24 0.975775 8.8424× 10−7 0.955251 0.0344693
25 0.983022 9.65909× 10−7 0.850342 0.0896586
26 0.997108 3.26761× 10−6 0.667209 0.0643818
27 1.00178 2.30702× 10−6 0.63024 0.134193
28 0.991328 3.02261× 10−7 0.750202 0.0612747
Table 2.
3.3. Experiment 3. In this experiment we took h(x) = 3(x − 1)2, 0 ≤ x ≤ 1 as
background distribution for the demand. Table 2 shows the results obtained for
values of N from 5 to 28.
3.4. Experiment 4. So far we have considered background demands distributed
according to power-like functions. It is important to experiment with more general
background distributions for the demand. Let us consider for instance a background
demand distributed as some randomly selected piecewise constant function g whose
graph is depicted in Figure 1.
Table 4 shows the results obtained for values of N from 5 to 28.
4. Analysis of results and conclusions
The results obtained in the previous section strongly indicate the presence of
q-exponential behavior, with q 6= 1, of the supply curve in the various tested scenar-
ios. The quadratic errors oscillated between 0.0013087 and 0.199687 in experiment
1, between 0.000517729 and 0.134193 in experiment 2, between 0.00021681 and
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Demand’s f.d.p based on 3(x− 1)2, 0 ≤ x ≤ 1
N q α β quadratic error
5 1.09464 0.206346 0.848798 0.0024282
6 1.09723 0.0711591 0.798572 0.00177619
7 1.10279 0.0319655 0.730883 0.00488975
8 1.11106 0.0156945 0.660128 0.00499712
9 1.09178 0.00541504 0.679568 0.00123698
10 1.09736 0.00281438 0.625793 0.000942782
11 1.09776 0.00163252 0.58577 0.000979379
12 1.06551 0.000271507 0.690339 0.000269798
13 1.0952 0.000422896 0.538375 0.00126523
14 1.08674 0.000198589 0.538884 0.000486154
15 1.09073 0.00012446 0.502844 0.00021681
16 1.06933 0.0000260694 0.565947 0.000614531
17 1.08805 0.0000376827 0.471669 0.000287819
18 1.08563 0.0000213679 0.460938 0.000232498
19 1.09183 0.0000198484 0.422582 0.00157232
20 1.10914 0.0000282786 0.36162 0.00176623
21 1.0921 8.29756× 10−6 0.392186 0.000280447
22 1.09542 6.87487× 10−6 0.368959 0.000318908
23 1.09237 4.13338× 10−6 0.364318 0.00249175
24 1.08245 1.33427× 10−6 0.383466 0.000381974
25 1.09711 2.89082× 10−6 0.32872 0.00305721
26 1.08742 1.0406× 10−6 0.344124 0.00312855
27 1.11564 5.33944× 10−6 0.269265 0.00625656
28 1.11006 2.83686× 10−6 0.271704 0.00357036
Table 3.
Figure 1.
0.00625656 in experiment 3, and between 0.0281123 and 2.882283 in experiment 4.
These errors are very small in comparison with the quantities being approximated.
It is important to observe that the emergence of q-exponential behavior in these
experiments cannot be due to any illegal behavior, since the mathematical model
assumes that prices are chosen independently by the generating firms. Figure 2
insinuates an interesting tendency: for fixed background demand, the value of q
gets closer to 1 as N gets larger. These observations suggest the following interpre-
tation. When the number of competing firms N is small, we can consider each one
of them as a maximally strong coalition of a large number of minifirms. This allows
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Demand’s f.d.p based on g(x), 0 ≤ x ≤ 1
N q α β quadratic error
5 0.72133 2.954427 1.129140 0.4091208
6 0.67358 0.821282 1.861038 1.8020197
7 0.64121 0.038771 6.119756 2.8822813
8 0.69959 0.005481 7.269161 1.2973836
9 0.73581 0.000718 8.862518 1.39342351
10 0.77651 0.000579 5.932255 0.6524641
11 0.80561 0.000245 5.070716 0.4075098
12 0.83691 0.000347 3.309873 0.0719115
13 0.85802 0.000301 2.624487 0.0562562
14 0.87835 0.000241 2.143395 0.1501309
15 0.90866 0.000540 1.418274 0.2352072
16 0.92360 0.000395 1.247219 0.2155978
17 0.94694 0.000562 0.961471 0.26144589
18 0.97006 0.000738 0.762271 0.2988319
19 0.98948 0.000945 0.628611 0.2476883
20 0.99752 0.000670 0.587217 0.2163773
21 1.01654 0.000856 0.491904 0.1813817
22 1.02361 0.000688 0.460020 0.2267202
23 1.02211 0.000373 0.463638 0.2033697
24 1.02958 0.000297 0.432238 0.1293418
25 1.02354 0.000119 0.457114 0.0546924
26 1.03403 0.000130 0.409306 0.0751101
27 1.04037 0.000121 0.381030 0.0664762
28 1.03368 0.000044 0.405377 0.0281123
Table 4.
Figure 2.
us to consider the small number of competing firms as a huge number of competing
firms divided into N groups so that firms belonging to one group strongly inter-
act mutually and firms belonging to different groups do not interact. Therefore N
getting larger has the effect of breaking coalitions, reducing in this way the level
of interaction, thus making q closer to 1. We infer that as N gets larger, the mar-
ket gets closer to a perfect competition market. This suggests the possibility of
modeling these markets as statistical mechanical systems having nontrivial particle
interaction [5], and justifying in this way the presence of q-exponential behavior in
this setting.
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